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Abstract:
This communication considers a problem of sharing a continuous resource (a duty taken on by a
central authority) among a certain number of users in order to satisfy as much as possible some
interests declined in terms of objectives by stakeholders (that constitute a community). Such
problems are encountered in many socioeconomic domains and mainly in situtations of sharing
natural resources such as water resource for diﬀerent socioeconomic activities such as drinking,
irrigation, breeding, industrial used, etc.. Formerly speaking, these problems constitute multi-
objectives optimization problem solved in the literature by a plethora of approaches. In this
communication, we choose to highlight bipolar analysis approach that permit to introduce some
ﬂexibility (a necessity for such problems) during the recommendation phase. Bipolar analysis
allow to aggregate separately incentives of the same nature (positive incentives separated from
negative ones) so that the trade-oﬀ process will be reduced to balancing positive and negative
aspects.
Keywords: Bipolar Analysis, Multiple Objectives Optimization, Continuous Resource Sharing,
Satisﬁcing Game Theory, Group Decision Making.
1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Natural resources sharing is a big issue nowadays because
of the multiplicity of parties interested in such process with
potentially antagonist stakes and the ultimate necessity
to ensure sustainability in the usage of these resources.
One such natural resource that can be almost qualiﬁed as
critical or strategic resource is water so that researchers
are devoting their eﬀort to develop methods and proce-
dures to manage eﬃciently and sustainably this resource
in the interest of humanity. For instance, in Davijani
et al. (2016), the problem of optimizing water resource
allocation to maximize socioeconomic eﬃciency has been
considered. As main objective functions, authors of this
study consider the maximization of economic proﬁt in var-
ious sectors including agriculture sector, industry sector,
municipality (in terms of water for drinking, sanitation
and recreation) and the maximization of employment as
a social performance indicator in these sectors mainly
in that of agriculture and industry. A multi-objectives
optimization model is developed and solved using soft-
computing techniques such as evolutionary computation
algorithms Zitzler (1999). A distributed constraint opti-
mization problem (DCOP) have been used in Amigoni et
al. (2015) for modeling the management of water resource
systems consisting of farmers, a dam, economic opera-
tors, and a city. The problem here consists in supplying
these diﬀerent actors in water withdrawn from the dam
when meeting some requirements of minimum inﬂow to
some systems and maximum withdraw from the dam. In
Singh et al. (2015), authors use multiple criteria deci-
sion making approach to evaluate alternative management
options in dairy farming with water resource limitation
as a constraint to satisfy. Many other applications re-
lated to water resource management and/or sharing with
sustainability stakes can be found in references cited in
the above analyzed publications. The main characteristics
that one can draw from previous mentioned studies are
that, water resource sharing and/or management problems
consist in optimizing many objectives, which objectives
depend on multiple attributes of alternative options, and
that many actors that we refer to as stakeholders’ concerns
or preferences must be taken into account when deriving
the resolution procedure. These problems therefore fall
into a large framework known as multi-objectives / multi-
attributes or criteria and group decision making problems.
Most of the approaches (that in general consider only one
aspect of that mentioned here) used to solve such problems
up to now in the literature, consist in transforming the
"multi" into mono using some aggregation approach in
order to use the well established "mono" optimization’s
algorithms that abound in optimization literature (Luen-
berger (1984); Moré and Wiright (1993)) or in searching
for Pareto (see Pareto (1896)) set and then choosing an
"appropriate" alternative within this set when using some
additional information or constraints. These approaches
do not distinguish, in earlier stages of decision process, the
diﬀerence that may exist between positive incentives of an
alternative and its negative impact with regard to a given
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1. I I L S
atural resources sharing is a big issue no adays because
of the ultiplicity of parties interested in such process ith
potentially antagonist stakes and the ulti ate necessity
to ensure sustainability in the usage of these resources.
ne such natural resource that can be al ost qualiﬁed as
critical or strategic resource is ater so that researchers
are devoting their eﬀort to develop ethods and proce-
dures to anage e ciently and sustainably this resource
in the interest of hu anity. or instance, in avijani
et al. (2016), the proble of opti izing ater resource
allocation to axi ize socioecono ic e ciency has been
considered. s ain objective functions, authors of this
study consider the axi ization of econo ic proﬁt in var-
ious sectors including agriculture sector, industry sector,
unicipality (in ter s of ater for drinking, sanitation
and recreation) and the axi ization of e ploy ent as
a social perfor ance indicator in these sectors ainly
in that of agriculture and industry. ulti-objectives
opti ization odel is developed and solved using soft-
co puting techniques such as evolutionary co putation
algorith s Zitzler (1999). distributed constraint opti-
ization proble ( ) have been used in igoni et
al. (2015) for odeling the anage ent of ater resource
syste s consisting of far ers, a da , econo ic opera-
tors, and a city. he proble here consists in supplying
these diﬀerent actors in ater ithdra n fro the da
hen eeting so e require ents of ini u inﬂo to
so e syste s and axi u ithdra fro the da . In
Singh et al. (2015), authors use ultiple criteria deci-
sion aking approach to evaluate alternative anage ent
options in dairy far ing ith ater resource li itation
as a constraint to satisfy. any other applications re-
lated to ater resource anage ent and/or sharing ith
sustainability stakes can be found in references cited in
the above analyzed publications. he ain characteristics
that one can dra fro previous entioned studies are
that, ater resource sharing and/or anage ent proble s
consist in opti izing any objectives, hich objectives
depend on ultiple attributes of alternative options, and
that any actors that e refer to as stakeholders’ concerns
or preferences ust be taken into account hen deriving
the resolution procedure. hese proble s therefore fall
into a large fra e ork kno n as ulti-objectives / ulti-
attributes or criteria and group decision aking proble s.
ost of the approaches (that in general consider only one
aspect of that entioned here) used to solve such proble s
up to no in the literature, consist in transfor ing the
" ulti" into ono using so e aggregation approach in
order to use the ell established " ono" opti ization’s
algorith s that abound in opti ization literature (Luen-
berger (1984); oré and iright (1993)) or in searching
for areto (see areto (1896)) set and then choosing an
"appropriate" alternative ithin this set hen using so e
additional infor ation or constraints. hese approaches
do not distinguish, in earlier stages of decision process, the
diﬀerence that ay exist bet een positive incentives of an
alternative and its negative i pact ith regard to a given
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Natural resources sharing is a big issue nowadays because
of he multiplicity of parties interested in such proc ss w h
pot tially antagonist stakes and the ultimate necessity
to nsure sustainability in the usage of these resources.
One such natural resource that can be almos qualiﬁed a
c itical r strat gic resource is water so that researchers
are devoting th ir eﬀort to develop methods and proce-
dures to manage eﬃciently and sustain bly this resource
in the interes of humanity. For instance, in Davijani
et al. (2016), the problem of ptimizing water re ource
allocation to maximize so ioeconomic eﬃciency has been
considered. As main objective functi s, auth rs of this
st dy consider the maximization of onomic proﬁt in va -
io s sectors including agricultu e sector, industry sect r,
municipali y (in terms of water for drinking, sanita ion
nd recreation) and the maximization of employment as
a social performance indicator in these sec ors ma nly
in that of agriculture and industry. A multi-objectives
optimization model is developed and solved using soft-
computing techniques such as evolutionary computation
algorithms Zitzler (1999). A distributed co straint opti-
mization problem (DCOP) h ve been used in Amig ni et
al. (2015) for modeling the management of water resou ce
systems cons sting of farm rs, a dam, economic opera-
or , and a city. The problem here consists in supplying
these diﬀ rent actors in water withdrawn fro the dam
when meeting some requiremen s of mini um inﬂow to
some systems and maximum withdraw from the dam. In
Singh et al. (2015), authors use multiple criteria d ci-
sion making ppro ch to evaluate lternative management
options in dairy farming with water resource limitation
as a c nstraint t satisfy. Many other applications re-
lated to wa er resource management and/or sharing with
sust inability stakes can be found in references cited in
e above analyzed publications. The main characteristics
one can draw from previous e tioned studies are
that, water resource sharing and/or management problem
consist in optimizing many objectives, which objectives
depend on multiple attribut s f alternative options, a d
that many actors that we refer to as stakeholders’ concer s
or p ferences must be taken into account w n deriving
the resolution procedure. These problems herefore fall
in o a large fram work known as multi-objectives / multi-
attributes or criteria and group decision making problems.
Most of the approaches (that in general con ider only one
aspect of that mentioned here) used o solve such problems
up to now in the literature, consist in ransforming the
"multi" into mono using some aggregation appro ch in
orde to use the well established "m o" op imization’s
algorithms that abound in optimization lite atur (Lue -
berger (1984); Moré and Wiright (1993)) or in searching
for Pareto (see Pareto (1896)) set and then choosing an
"appr priate" alternative within this set when using some
additional information or constraints. These approaches
o not distinguish, in earlier stages f decis on proc s, the
diﬀerence that may exis b tween pos ive incentives of a
alternative and its negative impact with regard to a given
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objective. In this communication we will highlight the
necessity to consider separately the positive and negative
aspects during evaluation process; indeed, any beneﬁciary
or user of such natural resource as water will generate
positive incentives for some aspects of the humanity or
community but also negative impact on other aspects.
The remainder of this communication is organized around
following items: in the second section the considered prob-
lem will be formerly deﬁned; a third section is devoted to
recalling quickly main approaches used in the literature to
solve similar problems with most of the time restricting the
approach to one aspect (for instance without taking into
account the inherent interaction between components of
the problem for instance); in section four the main contri-
bution of this communication is presented, continuous re-
source sharing integrating many ignored aspects of the lit-
erature are presented with the concept of bipolarity as the
underlying modeling notion; section ﬁve considers using
the developed approach to solve an illustrative application
problem; and section six concludes the communication.
2. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
In this communication we consider a problem where a
central decision maker (a central government, a regional
authority, a municipality, etc.) must decide which quantity
of a certain resource (water for instance) it must give to
each user in order to satisfy some collective objectives
(considered as a social choice) as well as individual or
local objectives such as getting a minimum of the shared
resource; more precisely we consider a water management
problem that consists in deciding which quantity of water
withdrawn from a common infrastructure such as a river
or a dam an authority must assign to each potential user
for its activity. Formerly we consider a certain continuous
quantity Q (without loss of generality we consider that
Q = 1) of a natural resource (quantity of water that can
be withdrawn from a natural or man made infrastructure
for some period) must be shared among n users for
their activities. The activities of users generate positive
outputs as well as negative outcomes with regards to a
broad panel of objectives that stakeholders engaged in the
decision process want to achieve. The assignment problem
is therefore organized around following elements.
• A discrete set O = {o1, o2, ..., ol} of objectives that
constitute a social choice of the community of stake-
holders (a stakeholder is an individual, a group of
individuals, an organization, etc. that are interested
in or are impacted by the outcome of decision being
made) that the central decision maker must satisfy as
much as possible is identiﬁed; meanwhile community
may express its preference by ranking objectives by
assigning them some weight where for instance ωj will
be the global weight assigned to objective j. Deter-
mination of such weights may not be easy, but some
recent research in the domain of voting, measuring
and ranking show that Condorcet technique that is
rank compatible, see Balinski and Laraki (2007), can
be used for this purpose. Indeed, Balinski and Laraki
(2007) proves that Condorcet’s method is appropriate
for ranking, so by using this approach where each
stakeholder will supply a rank proﬁle of objectives,
Condorcet count will constitute a sort of brut measure
of the weight to assign to each objective. Alternatively
each stakeholder may use pair wise comparison such
as AHP (see Saaty (1980)) to assign a weight to each
objective so that actual weight will be commensurate
to total weights from stakeholders.
• 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 is the proportion of quantity Q given
to stakeholder i and x = [ x1, x2, ..., xn ]T is the
assigned proportion vector.
Let us designate by X the compact set
X =

x : xi,min ≤ xi ≤ xi,max,
n
i=1
xi ≤ 1

; (1)
where xi,min, xi,max ∈ [ 0, 1 ] are minimum and maximum
proportion of resource allowable to stakeholder i; the
assignment problem can be therefore stated as: ﬁnd the
vector x ∈ X such that following objectives are satisﬁedmax
x

f+k (x)

, ∀ k = 1, ..., lp;
min
x

f−k (x)

, ∀ k = 1, ..., lm; (2)
where f+k (positive incentive), k = 1, ..., lp and f−k (nega-
tive impact), k = 1, ..., ln, are some objective functions to
optimize (lp is the number of objective functions that must
be maximized and lm those that are to be minimized);
this is a multi-objectives decision making or optimization
problem.
Besides of continuous resource (water) allocation problem
being considered in this communication, many real-world
problems are often formulated in terms of multiple objec-
tives optimization problems, see for instance Coello Coello
(1998); Steuer (1986); Zitzler (1999) and references therein
for some practical cases.
The broad and practical nature of multi-objectives op-
timization problem attracted many research approaches
and methods to solve these problems in the best ways as
much as possible; these methods that can be referred to as
classical methods are reviewed in the following section.
3. CLASSICAL APPROACHES FOR SOLVING
MULTI-OBJECTIVES OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
Some textual materials of this section come fromTchangani
(2010). Many classical approaches for solving multiple
objectives decision problems rely on the notion of the so-
called Pareto dominance Zitzler (1999) and Pareto-optimal
set and the resolution is organized around two processes:
search and decision making. Depending on how search
(ﬁnding a sample of Pareto-optimal set) and decision
process are combined, multiple objectives optimization
methods can be classiﬁed in three categories Zitzler (1999).
• Decision making before search: the objective func-
tions are aggregated into a single objective by using
some preference of the decision maker.
• Search before decision making: here a sample (or
totality) of Pareto-optimal set is obtained ﬁrst and
then a choice is made by a decision maker.
• Decision making during search: an interactive sequen-
tial optimization is performed where after each search
step, the decision maker is presented with a number
of alternatives and decide to stop or continuous the
search.
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 The ﬁrst approach to deal with multiple objectives decision
making problems has been the aggregation of objectives
into a single objective in diﬀerent ways leading to weight-
ing methods, constraint methods and goal programming
methods. The advantage of these methods is that eﬃcient
and broad algorithms developed for single objective opti-
mization problems (Luenberger (1984); Moré and Wiright
(1993) and references therein) can be used to solve the
resulting problems. The drawback of these techniques is
that the subjective intervention of the user is needed to
ﬁx weights for factors and it is known, see for instance
Zitzler (1999), that these methods are most of the time
not able to ﬁnding Pareto-optimal solutions in the case of
non convex feasible space. To overcome these drawbacks,
new methods have been designed based on evolutionary
algorithms, mainly genetic algorithms that are able to
generating eﬃciently Pareto-optimal solutions.
Classical basic methods that are used to solve these
problems are:
• weighting method, Steuer (1986), where original mul-
tiple objectives optimization problem is converted to
a single objective;
• constraint method, Steuer (1986): here l−1 objective
functions are transformed into constraints and the
remaining objective is optimized under these con-
straints.
• goal programming, Charmes et al. (1955): some goals
are deﬁned for each objective function as: less-than-
equal-to, fj(x) ≤ tj ; greater-than-equal-to, fj(x) ≥
tj ; equal-to, fj(x) = tj ; and within a range, fj(x) ∈
[tlj , tuj ]; and the problem now consists in ﬁnding an
assignment that ensures these goals; many variants of
this approach exist in the literature.
• evolutionary algorithm, see Zitzler (1999).
Rather than proposing a revolutionary (if any) approach
for solving problems presented so far, this communication
is dedicated to deriving a practical oriented framework
for eﬃciently constructing objective functions based on
decisions makers preferences, the problem at hand, and
most importantly, the underlying concept (or ultimate
goal) that the ﬁnal decision must follows or satisﬁes. Given,
economic, social, and environmental concerns manifested
by citizens nowadays, the concept of sustainability that
relies on these three objectives can be the underlying
ultimate goal of natural resource allocation problem such
as that considered in this communication. In the following
section, resource allocation among a certain number of ac-
tivities that generate positive incentives as well as negative
impacts on the well being of humans will be formulated
when taking into account many issues ignored in classical
approaches such as: interaction between attributes in the
contribution or opposition in the realization of an objec-
tive, interaction between objectives in the realization of
ultimate goal, or the relative importance of each activity,
etc..
4. PROPOSED APPROACH
Most diﬃculties in modelling decision making problems
such as that of resource sharing presented in the previous
sections are related to formulating functions to optimize;
constraints are in general straightforward as they are re-
lated to available resource limitation. In this communi-
cation we rely on the notions of positive (or supporting)
incentives and negative (or rejecting) incentives an activ-
ity may convey with regards to community’s objectives
to satisfy to design an assignment procedure to balance
these aspects, an approach referred to as bipolar analysis,
see for instance Tchangani (2015, 2014); Tchangani et al.
(2012); Tchangani (2006), for some developments related
to these issues. Indeed, we deﬁne ν+i (ok, x) (respectively
ν−i (ok, x)) to be the positive outcome (respect. negative
outcome) generated by the activity of stakeholder i on
the community objective k for a particular assignment x.
Performance indicators ν+i (ok, x) (respectively ν−i (ok, x))
can be obtained by combining (in some sense) positive
and negative function deﬁned in equation (2) respectively
or can simply be obtained using AHP (see Saaty (1980))
by answering question like "how positively (respect. neg-
atively) does stakeholder i contribute to the objective k
compared to stakeholder j".
4.1 Interaction between activities
In order to build an integrated framework for resource
allocation that takes into account, as much as possible, the
concerns of all stakeholders, one must consider possible
interaction between activities of users. Indeed, in some
cases, it may happen that the outcome or output of the
activity of a user i aﬀect the realization of activity of
user j in the beneﬁt of the community. To take this
issue into account in our model, we introduce interaction
indices a+ij(ok)/a−ij(ok) that measure the positive (respect.
negative) contribution degree of the activity of user i in
the realization of that of user j contributing to objective
ok. Building on Saaty and Vargas (1982), we propose
a procedure in two steps to determine these degrees by
experts for instance.
Step 1: relative contribution of users to the realization of
objectives One determine a relative importance degrees
0 < cr+i (ok) < 1 (respect. 0 < cr−i (ok) < 1) that represents
the relative contribution of user i in the satisfaction
(respect. dissatisfaction) of objective ok by using an AHP
analysis for instance.
Step 2: interdependency between users’ activities In a
second step, degrees d+ij(ok)/d−ij(ok) are determined to
represent the relative importance of the activity of user
i to that of user j toward positive (respect. negative)
incentives of objective ok. To do so, for each user i, one
can do a pair wise comparison of other n − 1 users by
answering question like "how important is the activity of
user i to the realization of that of user j compared to that
of user l in the achievement of positive (respect. negative)
incentive of objective ok?" using AHP approach or any
other procedure.
Finally the degree a+ij(ok)/ a−ij(ok) can be obtained as
given by equation (3)
a+ij(ok) = cr+i (ok)d+ij(ok) ; a−ij(ok) = cr−i (ok)d−ij(ok) (3)
with the conditions of equation (4)
n
i=1
cr×i (ok) = 1 and
n−1
j=1,j =i
d×ij(ok) = 1 (4)
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where × stands for + or −. Finally for each objective
ok users will interact through the interaction matrices
A+(ok) =

a+ij(ok)

and A−(ok) =

a−ij(ok)

; but this is
the immediate interaction eﬀects; in real world situation
inﬂuence may circulate within the interaction network in-
ﬁnitely so that the overall or total interaction or inﬂuence
matrices T×(ok) will be given by equation (5)
T×(ok) =
∞
l=1

A×(ok)
l = A×(ok)

I −A×(ok)
−1 (5)
that always exists thanks to classical Perron-Frobenious
theorem, see Meyer (2000). Indeed, by construction the
sum of the rows as well as the sum of the columns of
matrix A×(ok) is less than 1 that ensures that the matrix
I − A×(ok) is invertible and all coeﬃcients of its inverse
are non negative.
4.2 Bipolar allocation procedure
From the total interaction matrix T× =

t×ij(ok)

, users
can be classiﬁed according to their global contribution
to the objective ok; indeed one can calculate the global
contribution D+i (ok) (respect. D−i (ok)) of user i to the
activities of other users as given by the following equation
(6)
D×i (ok) =
n
j=1
t×ij(ok) (6)
and the global contribution of other users R×i (ok) to the
realization of activity of user i with regard to objective ok
given by equation (7)
R×i (ok) =
n
j=1
t×ji(ok). (7)
One can therefore consider ranking users using the index
D×i (ok)−R×i (ok) : users for which D×i (ok)−R×i (ok) > 0
constitute global active or dispatching users of incentive
× in the realization of objective ok whereas those for
which D×i (ok) − R×i (ok) < 0, are receiver or passive
users for the corresponding incentive ×. This remark may
be a basis for resource allocation procedure by choosing
for instance the appropriate multi-objectives optimization
scheme. Indeed, one can consider that the activity of
a user is most important that it inﬂuences activities of
many other users that is ranking with regards to the
parameter D×i (ok) or that it is more an active user than
a passive user that is using parameter D×i (ok) − R×i (ok)
to rank; this will constitute a basis to determine positive
and negative relative importance degrees ̟+i (ok) (respect.
̟−i (ok)) of the activity of each user i with regard to
objective ok. The global positive Ψk+(x) (respect. negative
Ψk−(x)) contribution of a particular allocation x for the
objective ok is therefore given by equation (8)
Ψk×(x) =
n
i=1
̟×i (ok)ν×i (ok, x). (8)
From materials deﬁned above and building on satisﬁc-
ing game theory (Stirling (2003)), we deﬁne the overall
selectability measure µS(x) and the overall rejectability
measure µR(x) for a particular assignment x by equation
(9)
µS(x) =
l
k=1
ωkΨk+(x) and µR(x) =
l
k=1
ωkΨk−(x) (9)
where ωk is the relative importance degree of objective ok
with regards to the overall allocation goal.
The following paragraph presents approaches to select the
best alternative x arguable to be satisﬁcing or good enough
allocation.
4.3 Satisﬁcing or good enough allocation
The satisﬁcing or good enough allocations are those for
which selectability degree µS(x) exceeds a non decreasing
function q of the rejectability degree µR(x). The set Σq of
satisﬁcing or good enough allocations is therefore deﬁned
by equation (10)
Σq = {x ∈ X : µS(x) ≥ q (µR(x))} ; (10)
the shape of non decreasing function q can be used to
manage the attitude of decision maker; a typical shape
of this function is given by the following Figure 1 that
enhances the fact that many decision makers exhibits a
risk taking attitude for low negative impact (rejectability
degree) and risk aversion attitude for high negative impact;
risk neutral attitude correspond to the case q (µR(x)) =
µR(x).
1
1
( )S xµ
( )R xµRisk taking attitude 
Risk averse attitude  
0
Risk neutral attitude
Fig. 1. Shap of boldness function q taking into account risk
attitude
A particular satisﬁcing alternative x ∈ Σq can be calcu-
lated by solving the following nonlinear programing prob-
lem (11)
min
x
(0) s.t. − µS(x) + q (µR(x)) ≤ 0, x ∈ X (11)
that can be solved using a general purpose software such
as MatlabTM with Optimization Toolbox or writing one’s
own code. The ﬁnal best alternative can then be selected
using diﬀerent criteria such as most selectable alternative,
least rejectable alternative, maximal discriminant alterna-
tive, maximum boldness alternative, or other.
The framework established so far which is a particular case
of BOCR analysis, see for instance Tchangani (2015), can
be considered as a dimensionality reduction approach, see
Giuliani et al (2014), based on practical considerations.
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 Furthermore some parameters of the framework such as
boldness function can be used to address real world appli-
cations’ concerns such as that raised in Farina and Amato
(2002).
5. APPLICATION
In this section we will illustrate the approach established so
far by considering a small practical case study. Authorities
of a rural area are confronted to a problem of eﬃciently
managing water coming from a lake of this area. There
are four main users (that we refer to as stakeholders) that
utilize water from the lake for their activities, namely:
• Municipality that has to withdraw water from the
lake for domestic use, that we refer to as stakeholder
S1;
• Farmers that need water from the lake for irrigation
purpose, known as stakeholder S2;
• Besides agriculture activity of previous point, there is
a great breeding activity in the area that necessitates
water from the lake, stakeholder S3;
• There is an industrial plant installed in the area that
needs to use water from the lake for its activity, we
call it stakeholder S4.
Here xi is the quantity of water stakeholder i is allowed to
withdraw from the lake. The problem for these authorities
is therefore to determine which quantity of water each
stakeholder is allowed to withdraw from the lake each year
in order to ensure sustainable development of the area; so
that, as it is well accepted from the sustainability concept,
there are three main objectives to satisfy when decid-
ing how to share water from the lake, namely economic
objective (o1), social objective (o2), and environmental
objective (o3).
For this illustrative application (and because of the limita-
tion of the communication length) we will ignore potential
interaction; meanwhile we derive directly relative impor-
tance degrees ̟+i (ok) and ̟−i (ok) by using the following
procedure. For each objective ok, two comparison matrices
Ω+ok and Ω−ok of stakeholders are built using classical AHPmethod to represent positive comparison score and neg-
ative comparison score respectively. A simple way to do
this is to choose a pivot stakeholder Sp and compare other
stakeholders against it by answering question like "how
important is the positive (respectively negative) contribu-
tion of stakeholder Si to the objective ok in comparison
of the contribution of pivot stakeholder ?" to obtain notes
υ+(i, p)/υ−(i, p) from the classical AHP table. Consistent
matrices Ω+ok and Ω−ok are then obtained by equations (12)-
(13)
Ω+ok(p, i) =
1
υ+(i, p) ; Ω
+
ok(i, j) =
υ+(i, p)
υ+(j, p) (12)
Ω−ok(p, i) =
1
υ−(i, p) ; Ω
−
ok(i, j) =
υ−(i, p)
υ−(j, p) (13)
Final positive/negative relative importance degrees̟+i (ok)
(respect. ̟−i (ok)) of stakeholder Si for objective ok are
determined from comparison matrices by equations (14)-
(15)
̟+i (ok) =
1
n



n
j=1
 Ω+ok(i, j)n
l=1Ω+ok(l, j)




; (14)
̟−i (ok) =
1
n



n
j=1
 Ω−ok(i, j)n
l=1Ω−ok(l, j)




. (15)
We will illustrate this approach for objective o1 (economic
objective) of our application to get comparison matrices
of equations (16) and (17)
Ω+o1 =



o1 S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 1 1/5 1/3 1/9
S2 5 1 5/3 5/9
S3 3 3/5 1 3/9
S4 9 9/5 9/3 1



; (16)
Ω−o1 =



o1 S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2
S2 2 1 1 1
S3 2 1 1 1
S4 2 1 1 1



; (17)
it means that in terms of economic objective (o1), experts
consider that farmers (S2) contribute 5 times, agriculture
(S3) 3 times, and industry (S4) 9 times positively than mu-
nicipality (S4); and these three activities contribute each 2
times negatively to economic objective than municipality;
other relative proportions are straightforward to interpret.
Similar considerations for other objectives lead to results of
following Table 1 in terms of relative importance degrees.
Stakeholders ̟+i (ok) ̟−i (ok)
o1 o2 o3 o1 o2 o3
S1 0.05 0.17 0.62 0.14 0.08 0.04
S2 0.28 0.33 0.16 0.29 0.23 0.23
S3 0.17 0.33 0.12 0.29 0.31 0.31
S4 0.50 0.17 0.10 0.29 0.38 0.41
Table 1: Evaluation of each user with regard to pursued
objectives
If we consider the three objectives to be with equal im-
portance and that the contribution of each user is com-
mensurate to the proportion it receives with the same
proportional coeﬃcient, that is ν×i (ok, x) = xi ∀ k, one
can consider the selectability measure and the rejectability
measure to be given by equations (18) and (19) respec-
tively
µS(x) = 0.84x1 + 0.77x2 + 0.62x3 + 0.77x4; (18)
µR(x) = 0.26x1 + 0.75x2 + 0.91x3 + 1.08x4. (19)
Let us suppose that it is admitted that none of the user
should receive less than 1% of the allocation meaning that
xi,min = 0.01 ∀ i; then the satisﬁcing allocation set at
boldness index of q = 1 is given by equation (20)
Σ1 =

x :
−0.58x1 − 0.02x2 + 0.29x3 + 0.31x4 ≤ 0
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 ≤ 1
0.01 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀ i

(20)
Proceedings of the 20th IFAC World Congress
Toulouse, France, July 9-14, 2017
3236
which is, mathematically speaking, a constraint satisfac-
tion problem; an example of an allocation obtained by
optimizing a null function subjected to constraints of (20)
using Matlab function linprog is
x = [ 0.1923 0.0590 0.0127 0.0102 ]T
meaning that a total of 27.41% of the capacity is utilized
and allocated according to following scheme: 19.23% for
the municipality, 5.90% for the farmers, 1.27% for breed-
ing, and 1.02% for the industry. Now let us suppose that we
want to maximize the total allocation that is maximizing
the function x1 + x2 + x3 + x4, in this case the "optimal"
allocation vector is given by
x = [ 0.3901 0.2361 0.0896 0.2842 ]T
that is the total available quantity is shared according to
the following scheme: 39.01% for the municipality, 23.61%
for the farmers, 8.96% for breeding, and 28.42% for the
industry
6. CONCLUSION
The problem of allocating continuous resource such as
water to diﬀerent users for their activities when meeting
some societal requirements in terms of sustainable devel-
opment is considered in this communication. Because any
socioeconomic activity convey positive outputs as well as
negative ones, bipolar analysis that relies on aggregating
positive and negative features of an alternative decision
(here an allocation) separately is used as the underlying
concept to formulate the allocation problem. The contri-
bution consists in proposing a framework within which
one can analyze an allocation problem when taking into
account inevitable interaction between actors engaged in
the decision process. From the so called interaction matrix,
a sort of preemptivity analysis can be done to ﬁnd which
user’s activity is susceptible to inﬂuence other activities
in the spirit to privilege those activities that have more
impact on the overall decision goal such as the sustain-
ability of allocation. A small real world application in the
domain of water sharing between four activities with the
sustainability as the main objective shows the feasibility
of the proposed approach.
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